A Critical Appraisal of the Concept of Necessity and Necessarily True Proposition

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Abstract:
The popular notion that truth is an essential element of knowledge has triggered inquiries into the nature of truth and propositions that can qualify as being true. In investigating truth as a quintessential element of knowledge, scholars and thinkers have arrived at diverse notions of truth, manifesting unique characteristics that typify them. One of those notions of truth is the concept of necessity and the necessarily true proposition. It entrenches the perspective that truth is absolute, and its negation, impossible. It holds that statements, realities, and occurrences could not have been contrary to the way that they were posed, presented, or spoken of. This paper thus seeks to explicate the concept of necessity as a necessarily true proposition. By examining the grounds that either corroborate or falsify the notion that truth is alike in all possible worlds, we showed the problem inherent in the idea of analytic truth as juxtaposed to synthetic truth, which is often considered the basis of our idea of necessary truth. However, in spite of the positivists’ and Quine’s critiques of analyticity and, by extension, the concept of necessity, we argued that without certain forms of necessity, at least hypothetically, our idea of knowledge will be threatened.

INTRODUCTION

The unfolding of events and widening range of the curious human mind, led to metaphysical and epistemological questions, as accounted by early Greek scholars. From crude questions of "why" and "how", to more specific intricate probes on causation, identity, truth, experience and reality. The mind seems to be drawn into the territory of perpetual curiosity, especially, in the quest for the true and real.
Perhaps, given that the perceived reality and truth of ideas and things, gave rise to more questions; it would be prudent therefore, to wonder if those things and ideas were true (if anything else). Complicated questions as: what is truth? Are my ideas, concepts and propositions true? Would they be true in all possible worlds? Gave rise to a persuasion that ideas, propositions and facts of experience are either necessary or contingent. Necessary, if they are absolute; contingent, if they are not.

The concept of necessity and necessarily true proposition emphasizes that things are the way they are because they cannot possibly be otherwise, whether true or false. This idea can be indirectly deduced from the teachings of Parmenides, who held unto the idea of permanence against change. Though Parmenides made no direct emphasis on necessity, his insistence that "nothing becomes anything else" (Omoregbe 1991, p.5), lends support to the concept of necessity and necessarily true propositions. Simply put, things that are true are true, and cannot be false because the nature they manifest (truth), cannot be otherwise, as a matter of necessity.

In view of the foregoing, the hitherto insatiable human mind wonders into spheres that could possibly negate the concept of necessity and necessarily true propositions by raising contradictory propositions of necessity can we not find, even in experience, things that their nature could be altered in another possible environment, time or world? Do such a thing as necessity and necessarily true proposition exist in a world which manifests changes, chaos and randomness? Can a proposition be true, irrespective of time and the capricious nature of natural phenomena? Is the concept of necessity and necessarily true proposition not vulnerable to the weaknesses of hard determinism? Does not the idea of contingent truths seem more tenable and easily reconcilable with the objects of human experience? These questions and more arise in the discussion of the concept of necessity and necessarily true propositions.

The task of this research is precisely, to offer "A Critical Appraisal of the Concept of Necessity and Necessarily True Propositions", by providing a detailed outline of the concept of necessity, in contrast to contingency, to aid readers in their attempt to appreciate or critique these concepts. These and more, the we intend to achieve predominantly by analyzing related texts and authors who had an influence on the subject.

PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS OF NECESSITY

The idea of necessity is used by many philosophers in the same vein as absolute determinism (Uduigwomen 2015). Necessity is the idea that everything that happens is necessary and ordered in their course. It opposes the logic of chance or contingency, and presents the world as a product of structured necessities.

From the philosophical perspective, Parmenides of Elea had a mild touch of necessity when he extolled the notion of permanence and order, while refuting the idea of "becoming". For Parmenides, whatever is, cannot become otherwise, and whatever is not, cannot be contrary (Lawhead 2002). Relating the Parmenidean standpoint on "not becoming" to the idea of necessity is specified in the insistence that necessity cannot "become" anything else in all possible worlds.

Though this research appraises the Eleatic school for an element of necessity, it is important to note that Parmenides and his proteges did not specify explicitly engage in discourses about necessity. Rather, Leucippus the atomist was the first to develop a precise idea of philosophical necessity when he wrote: "Nothing occurs at random, but everything for a reason and by necessity" (Buckly 1991, p.
23).

For a philosopher who ridiculed the Parmenidean negation of space; who believes in plurality and motion of atoms in space, it seemed a tall order to find a common ground that can accommodate the idea that all things are necessitated and therefore, cannot "not" occur, denial of randomness and motion of atoms in space. The reason Leucippus appeared to abandon his idea of necessity and determinism, may not be far-fetched (Lawhead 2002, p. 35).

In the classical period, Aristotle's realism culminated in developing a logic that accepts the orthodoxy that contradictory propositions cannot be both true and false. Moreover, in accepting causal explanations, Aristotle admitted to necessity, for a cause produces its effect as a matter of necessity. If A causes B, it follows that when there is A, B becomes a necessity. Nathaniel Stein opined:

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects (Stein 2012, p. 6).

In other words, the significance of causal relations (as developed by Aristotle) would collapse without the idea of necessity. That is, if a cause does not necessitate its effect, it cannot be relied upon in causal explanations.

However, Plato's conception of necessity tends to a more teleological path, evident in his explication in "Timaeus". Plato presents an elaborately wrought account of the formation of the universe and an explanation of its order (Lawhead 2002, p. 28). The universe (for Plato) is purposive; imitating an unchanging eternal model with explanatory principles as accurate as mathematical axioms. Things did not just occur or not occur; they are necessitated by the eternal rational order. Things found in experience are effects of Supra sensible ideals that they are structured to model. Necessity is therefore, the only solution to chaos in the universe. Necessity is then inevitable for some neoplatonists, and a pattern to be followed by others.

The theology of the renaissance filtered into early modern philosophy and influenced many modern philosophers into accepting necessity against contingency; being easily reconcilable with Christian theology of theism and creationism. Thinkers like Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton, who did not adopt necessity on the ground of theology, declined its categorical refutation because of the link to causation and induction.

Barush Spinoza established his pantheistic monism on the logic of necessity, and held that necessity is, both rationally warrantable and empirically traceable. For Spinoza, “Nothing is supernatural or extranatural. Not only is God's nature necessary, but the relation of following God's nature is also necessary. Thus, all things- or perhaps, all facts or, perhaps, all truths are necessary."(Spinoza as cited in Buckly 1991, p. 2). In Spinoza, the idea is not discretionairy; contingency is not compatible with the modalities of nature and existence, and should not be introduced in the discourse of nature. He reckoned: "In nature, nothing is contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way."(Koistinen 2019, p. 33). Spinoza's thoughts are that, hence, it was impossible to exist without taking part in the divine nature, existence from inception had already taken part in necessity, and cannot manifest any contrariness.

Gottfried Leibniz followed Spinoza's insistence on necessity, but differed in his application. For Leibniz, God's nature interfered with the nature of other necessities, meaning that, some necessities are (more or less) necessary than others. This interpretation aids the dispelling of the fear that Leibniz'
notion of many possible (but non actual) worlds, conflicts with Spinoza's necessity. In Leibniz' "principle of sufficient reason", he negated contingency and chance by claiming that all truths are explainable and traceable to a cause, and justified by that which had necessitated them.

Apparently, the efforts of the above discussed philosophers on the idea of necessity, are not without their shortcomings. One being that their formulation made necessity a tool for theology and science, or a synonym for causality, determinism, predictability or certainty.

JOSEPH PRIESTLEY'S DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY

We have elucidated different roots of philosophical necessity: but none (apart from Spinoza's and Leibniz') could be referred to as a holistic appraisal. The above stated is a key interest for 18th century British polymath, Joseph Priestley.

Philosophizing in a period saturated with many metaphysical concepts, Priestley published his *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity* in which he advanced the idea of necessity. Priestley negated the idea of free will and sought to reconcile his views with the theological notion that nothing could have been without a universal order. The world and human mind are not above the laws of causation and, therefore, cannot be against the nature of God. He contends that any concept that does not constrain reality and truth to causal laws of necessity, will only produce chaos, indiscretion and ambiguity.

Contingency is akin to freelance and would not bold well for the definitions of freedom and duty in articulating the idea of necessity, Priestley writes that the existence of *principal ideas* is a mark of necessity, because they are directed by God. Since every occurrence responds to fixed causal laws or principal ideas, there is no way different events can occur when the circumstances are exactly identical. Provided the circumstances are the same, the outcome becomes a matter of necessity. This notion eliminates contingency entirely, like Spinoza; destroys the possibility of random occurrences and chance. In Stanford's words: "There is no room left for the possibility of variation. Everything becomes part of an entirely determined chain of causes and effects."(Spinoza and naturalism 2002, para. 5).

Moreover, Priestley argues that philosophical necessity is supported and granted by the nature of God as "all knowing". Contingency would have denied God the possibility of foreseeing events. Though Priestley insisted that necessity and God's omniscience is by no means predestination.

PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY AND ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS

Priestley related philosophical necessity with association of ideas, but was careful not to follow David Hume's skepticism. Human motives(will) exist, but cannot be said to be free; for the will is part of the causal chains of associated ideas, regulated by natural laws. The will tends to find a part in the association of ideas and cannot be indiscriminate. Therefore, virtue or vice, good or evil are encapsulated in the eternal chain of occurrences following a causal order and regulated by God. From this view point, ideas are not as loose and separate as Hume purported, neither are they entirely dependent on the mind as Descartes seemed to press. Priestly argues:

The principle of association states that ideas are generated from external sensation. Complex ideas are made up of simple ideas. These complex ideas are formed through repeated juxtaposition or 'association' overtime. This means that ideas become united in the mind so that one idea will be invariably followed by the other (Encyclopedia of philosophy).
This unity achieved in Priestley's 'association of ideas' is the reason chance, randomness and claims of contingently distinct acts and occurrences are improbable. To get to grips with Priestley's idea of philosophical necessity is to accept the interpretation of philosophical necessity as a concept that occurrences could not have been otherwise, as they are granted by a superior Priestley concluded in terms this categorical: "All things past and present could not have been contrary for they are necessary; necessitated by the author of nature who permits that order."(Schanicher 2017, p. 14).

TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY

There is a perceived admittance that a proposition is necessary if it could not have failed to be the case; but the veracity of how necessary truths are achieved and identified, split opinions. This split has resulted in different conceptions of necessity.

1. **Metaphysical necessity:** This thoroughly questions the Leibnizean postulation of many possible worlds. It rejects the idea that any other world is possible, and holds that this is the only possible world. Therefore, truths, given in this world are necessary. Example, if all men had twelve legs in this world, men having twelve legs would be a necessity, because the thought of any other world where men had more or less than twelve legs is untenable.

2. **Logical necessity:** This type of necessity was favored by Bertrand Russell and W.V.O Quine (amongst others). Logical necessity finds the truth of a proposition in its definition. Such truths are necessitated by the rules of logic, in such a way, that, no reason justifies their negation. Logical necessity is like analytic truth according to Quine: "When something is logically necessary it is permitted by the rules of proper reason; in that, it becomes the outcome of all proper reasoning" (1993, p. 164).

3. **Empirical necessity:** is usually likened to Kant's aposteriori statements because of the truth derived from experience. Empirical necessity holds that the truth of a statement is dependent on observation and empirical verification. Empirically necessary statements may not be true in all possible worlds.

4. **Nomological necessity:** as a type of necessity, depends on physical laws. Nomological necessity is based on natural laws and physics.

CONCEPTS RELATED TO THE IDEA OF PHILOSOPHICAL NECESSITY

**Fatalism**

Joseph Priestley was swift in dispelling the synonymous use of necessity and fatalism. According to Wikipedia, Fatalism is a philosophical doctrine that explains all events or actions, in terms of fate or destiny. Fatalism accepts predestination as the basic law of all existence, upon which all actions are based. Fatalism is a psychological impediment to the operation of the human will, as it pushes through a resignation that nothing can alter what happens. Fatalism and predestination assume the existence of a supra sensible entity, who makes decrees.

Priestley, rightly understood fatalism as being incompatible with science, and rejected it. whereas philosophical necessity helped advance scientific induction, fatalism entrenched a set of metaphysical hypotheses that turned the tide to the age of casual conjectures. Priestly was of the view that philosophical necessity has an advantage over fatalism because it relies on natural laws and logic, while fatalism is built on metaphysical postulations, merely assumed to be connected with reality (Hartly 2012, p. 29).

Contemporary thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger (amongst others), refuted fatalism.
because it had negative implications for human existential psychology. Sartre argues that fatalism makes man's existence unnecessary, as his life would have been lived before he came into existence. Immanuel Kant also frowned at fatalism because it destroyed the possibility of free will, and stripped man of moral responsibility. Kant believes that, if a decider had already decided our actions, one cannot be liable for those actions. Fatalism then, destroys the logic of freedom and responsibility (Lawhead 2002, p. 36).

**Determinism**

Determinism is another concept closely related to the idea of philosophical necessity (and fatalism). Whereas fatalism and determinism suggest that the end of all events is decided by influences beyond or beside us; philosophical necessity does not deny the possibility of we being the masters of our fate. "In fatalism, we have one true 'fate' and we will end up there no matter what. Our life may take whatever journey it wants, but we cannot escape our eventual fate... Determinism on the other hand, means not only that we have one pre-decided that we will end up with, but also that every event in our life is decided by earlier events and actions. In short, Fatalism is a theory that there is some destiny we cannot avoid, although we are able to take different paths up to this destiny. Determinism, however, is the theory that the entire path of our life is decided by earlier events and actions."(Ben 2013, pp. 33-34).

The above extraction exposes determinism in its simplest form, and offers clear distinction between determinism, fatalism and the idea of philosophical necessity. Determinism accepts human roles in determining events, as well that, human actions and natural laws come in causal chains leading to occurrences. Where determinism may permit logical inferences, causal explanations and empirically verifiable truths, as does philosophical necessity; fatalism does not. Priestly summarized thus: "Necessity must be disambiguated from Its close relatives: determinism, certainty predictability, causality, predestination and Fatalism."(Priestly 2011, p. 14).

**NECESSARILY TRUE PROPOSITIONS**

Gottlob Frege had argued that every proposition has two values: truth or falsehood. That is to say that every proposition is either true or false. To appreciate the truth value of propositions, it is essential to establish that a proposition is a statement putting forth an idea or suggestion. Following this definition, if a proposition is true, the truth value is true, if false, the truth value is false. A true proposition is a proposition whose truth value is true. Example, this researcher is a human being is a true proposition because that is the case.

Necessary truth propositions are therefore taken to be those propositions that cannot possibly return a truth value, false. They are always true in all circumstances because their truth value is granted by their nature. Necessary truth propositions are similar to the Kantian analytic statements, which many logicians refer to as tautological. Such statements cannot mean anything else and could not have been contrary or false. Examples of such statements include: All bodies are extended, mathematical truths like 2+2=4 etc.

Leibniz is credited with explicitly contrast necessary truth propositions with contingent truth propositions. Contingent truths (for Leibniz), are dependent on some factors, and are probable. Their truth value may not be true if all things were (not) equal. Examples are Social scientific truths, because they rely on variable social phenomena. The Oxford reference explained contingent truths as: "One
that is true as it happens, or as things are, but that did not have to be true" Contingent truths are therefore only true, if they have been proven to be true; they may not be so in another world.

In his *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781 & 1787) Kant made and explicit separation of two form distinctions of propositions. On the one end is the distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* propositions and on other end, is the distinction between *a priori* and *empirical* propositions (Russell 1991, p. 706). Kant considers an analytic proposition as a proposition in which the predicate is part of the subject. Propositions such as the following could be considered as instances of an analytic proposition; “a tall man is a man,” or “an equilateral triangle is a triangle.” Analytic propositions are based on the law of contradiction thus, as with the case of the aforementioned instances, it would amount to self-contradiction were we to state that a tall man is not a man or that an equilateral triangle is not a triangle. Synthetic propositions refer to propositions that are not analytic, that is; all the propositions that we know only through the sense experience. Knowledge of its propositions are not arrived at by mere analysis of its subject and predicate but by recourse to experience. However, unlike Leibniz, Kant objects to the ideas that all synthetic propositions are only known through experience (Russell 1991, p. 706).

The other distinction of propositions made by Kant is empirical and *a priori* proposition, He classified empirical propositions as propositions we cannot know unless by the aid of our sense-perception or that others whose testimony we consider reliably. “The facts of history and geography are of this sort; so are the laws of science, whenever our knowledge of their truth depends on observational data” (Russell 1991, p. 706). On the other hand, *a priori* propositions are propositions “which, though may be elicited by experience, is seen, when known, to have a basis other than experience” (Russell 1991, p. 707). Pure mathematics are example of a priori propositions. Hume had argued elaborately that the law of causality contrary to the view commonly held at the time is not analytic, and thus he inferred that we could not be certain of its truth. Kant accepted the view that it is synthetic but nonetheless maintained that it is known *a priori*, he insisted that arithmetic and geometry are synthetic, but are also *a priori*.

THE POSITIVISTS’ PERSPECTIVE

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein divided up the class of meaningful sentences, or statements, into three classes; first, analytic sentences (or, for him, *tautologies*), which were supposed to be true in virtue of meaning alone. Secondly, contradictions, which were supposed to be false in virtue of meaning alone. Lastly, synthetic sentences, the truth or falsity of which was thought to depend both on what they mean and on the way the world is (Soames 2003, p. 261). Traditionally, many philosophers have distinguished between analytic and synthetic statements, Soames (2003) is of the view that not all of them have drawn the distinction in the way that Wittgenstein and the positivists did. One important feature of the way that Wittgenstein and the positivists made the distinction was that, for them, the analytic/synthetic distinction coincided exactly with the necessary/contingent distinction, and the apriori/aposteriori distinction (Soames 2003, p. 261). A necessary truth is a statement that is true, and could not have been otherwise.

Wittgenstein and the positivists held that all necessary truths are analytic, and that meaning was the source of necessity. For Wittgenstein, the basis of this view lay in his contention that for a sentence to *say* anything, for it to provide any information, is for its truth to *exclude* certain possible states that the world could be in. Since necessary truths exclude nothing, they say nothing; and since they say nothing about the way the world is, the way the world is makes no contribution to their being true. Hence, their
truth must be due to their meaning alone. The positivists, who found this conclusion welcome, emphasized a different line of reasoning. Being empiricists, they believed that all knowledge about the world is dependent on observation and sense experience (Soames 2003, p. 261).

It follows that since a priori truths can be known independently of observation and sense experience, they must not be about the world; and if they don’t tell us anything about the world, then the world must play no role in determining that they are true. Rather, their truth must be due to their meanings alone. Soames pointed out that Wittgenstein’s reasoning identified the necessary with the analytic, whereas the positivists’ reasoning identified the apriori with the analytic. Thus, for these philosophers, the necessary, the apriori, and the analytic were one and the same.

Soames is of the opinion that the positivists were specifically “inclined to cite a kind of explanatory priority” (2003, p. 263) and the reason for this he thinks is hinged on the positivists’ insistence for the necessity or aprioricity of any sentence to be found in its analyticity. Thus, for the positivists, without an appeal to analyticity, one could make no sense of the notion of knowing something to be true, not only given the way the world actually is, but given any possible state that the world could be in. This view is founded on the fact that we rarely do examine all possible world-states and juxtapose the proposition with them individually. And on the contrary, if the truth of statement is guaranteed by its meaning, then in knowing its meaning we know, or are in a position to come to know, that it must be true, no matter what state of the world happens to be in. Hence, “Knowledge of meaning explains knowledge of necessity” (Soames 2003, p. 264).

According to Ayer in his Language, Truth, and Logic, necessary truths are true no matter what way the world is because they are true in virtue of meaning. Similarly, they are knowable a priori, without appeal to empirical evidence for justification, because this knowledge is nothing more than knowledge of meaning. Certainly, there is no philosophical mystery in our being able to know what we have decided our words are to mean (Soames 2003, p. 264). Merging the two ideas of aprioricity and analyticity, the positivist thought that they had found a philosophical explanation for the problematic issue of our a priori knowledge of necessary truths. This is better explained in the words of Soames;

And surely, the positivists thought, there is no mystery in the idea that the truth of a sentence may follow, and be known by us to follow, entirely from our decisions about meaning. Putting these two ideas together, they thought that they had found a philosophical explanation of what otherwise would have been problematic—our apriori knowledge of necessary truths. For example, the statements that (1) if a man is bachelor, then he is unmarried, and (2) either it rained in Oxford on May 1, 1935 or it didn’t rain in Oxford on May 1, 1935 are necessary truths which are knowable apriori. We know these things because we know what the words in (1) and (2) mean, and we know that the truth of these sentences follows from the meanings we have assigned to those words. The same holds for our apriori knowledge of any necessary truth—including all the truths of logic and mathematics (Soames 2003, p. 264).

As argued by Soames, the are a couple of issues with the Positivists’ attempt to reduce the problem of necessity and aprioricity to a problem of meaning. First he pointed out that the conflation of necessary truths with truths that are knowable a priori is fraught with difficulties which were elaborately dealt with in by Saul Kripke in his Naming and Necessity. Second, W. V. Quine in his Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) debunked the positivists claim that analyticity was conceptually prior to the notions of necessity and aprioricity and could be used to give philosophically satisfying explanations of the
latter. Quine’s thesis had affected the positivist central doctrine that emphasizes the criterion of meaning. Third, the positivists’ seem to have undermined the difficulty involved in the task of explaining apriori knowledge by appeal to knowledge of meaning (Soames 2003, p. 265). It is owing to some of these reasons that the positivists’ program of explaining a priori knowledge by means of appeal to analyticity and linguistic conventions failed.

QUINE ON ANALYTICITY

In his Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), W. V. Quine sets out to show the problem inherent in the philosophy of the logical positivists. Specifically, the problem of the dichotomy between analytic and synthetic truth on the one hand and reductionism on the other hand. Here we shall be concerned with the first class of distinction. In the opening paragraph of the paper, Quine explicitly stated his problem with the central tenants of the logical positivists’ philosophy and what he intends to do about it. He explained that:

Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which a analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of facts, and truths which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refers to immediate experience (Quine 1951, p. 280).

Analyticity for Quine can be “demarcated thus; a statement is analytic if it is (not merely true but) true according to the semantical rule” (Quine 1951, p. 286) Therefore, Quine engaged in a task to show that the both aforementioned ‘dogmas’ are “ill-founded”. Nearly the first four subsections of his paper was focused on arguments against analyticity in an attempt to show how explanations of analyticity lands us into some form mere circularity. Quine began by establishing a difference between two forms of analytic statements. The first one he referred to as logically true and has the form:

(1) No unmarried man is married

A sentence with that form is true independent of the interpretation of "man" and "married", so long as the logical particles "no", "un-" and "is" have their ordinary English meaning.

The statements in the second class have the form:

(2) No bachelor is married.

A statement with this form can be turned into a statement with form (1) by exchanging synonyms with synonyms, in this case "bachelor" with "unmarried man". It is the second class of statements that lack characterization according to Quine. The notion of the second form of analyticity leans on the notion of synonymy, which Quine believes is in as much need of clarification as analyticity. Nearly all of Quine's subsequent arguments are focused on showing how explanations of synonymy end up being dependent on the notions of analyticity, necessity, or even synonymy itself.

Apparently, "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are not interchangeable in that sentence. To exclude that example and some other obvious counterexamples, such as poetic quality, Quine introduces the notion of cognitive synonymy. But does interchangeability hold as an explanation of cognitive synonymy? (Quine 1951, p. 284). Suppose we have a language without modal adverbs like "necessarily". Such a language would be extensional, in the way that two predicates which are true about the same objects are interchangeable again without altering the truth-value. Thus, there is no assurance that two terms that are interchangeable without the truth-value changing are interchangeable because of meaning, and
not because of chance. For example, "creature with a heart" and "creature with kidneys" share extension.

In a language with the modal adverb "necessarily" the problem is solved, as salva veritate holds in the following case:

(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men while it does not hold for

(5) Necessarily all and only creatures with a heart are creatures with kidneys.

Presuming that 'creature with a heart' and 'creature with kidneys' have the same extension, they will be interchangeable salva veritate. But this interchangeability rests upon both empirical features of the language itself and the degree to which extension is empirically found to be identical for the two concepts, and not upon the sought for principle of cognitive synonymy.

It seems that the only way to assert the synonymy is by supposing that the terms 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonymous and that the sentence "All and only all bachelors are unmarried men" is analytic. But for salva veritate to hold as a definition of something more than extensional agreement, i.e., cognitive synonymy, we need a notion of necessity and thus of analyticity.

So, from the above example, it can be seen that in order for us to distinguish between analytic and synthetic truth we must appeal to synonymy; at the same time, we should also understand synonymy with interchangeability salva veritate. However, such a condition to understand synonymy is not enough so we not only argue that the terms should be interchangeable, but necessarily so. And to explain this logical necessity we must appeal to analyticity once again. Thus, the argument is circular, and fails (Quine 1951, p. 287).

Rather than accept the positivists’ doctrine of reductionism, Quine proceeded to propose that it is the whole field of science and not single statements that are verified. All scientific statements are interconnected. Logical laws give the relation between different statements, while they also are statements of the system. This renders talks about the empirical content of a single statement misleading. It also becomes impossible to draw a line between synthetic statements, which depend on experience, and analytic statements. Any statement can be held as necessarily true according to Quine, if the right changes are made somewhere else in the system. In the same way, no statements are immune to revision. Thus, Quine subscribes to a form of “thorough pragmatism” with regards to the question of “choosing between language forms and scientific frameworks” (Quine 1951, p. 292) and not some idea of necessarily true proposition.

CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE CONCEPT OF NECESSITY AND NECESSARILY TRUE PROPOSITION

The idea of philosophical necessity and necessarily true propositions (like other philosophical concepts), is advanced by its proponents as an idea that appeases rationality, embraces scientific cogency and empirical authenticity. However, this does not dismiss the weaknesses inherent in the concept, or its unsustainability, when placed in juxtaposition to concepts such as contingency and pragmatism. As emphasized by Hanley, "Necessity could not have been without criticism: for it is a philosophical thought, provoked by the quest for 'better knowledge'. The questions raised about it, could not even destroy it's reasonableness” (Hanley 2017, p. 9). Moreover, in spite of the presumptive case in favour of the notion of necessary truth, some philosophers have found reason to raise pertinent
questions with regards to the possibility of there been a such a thing as necessarily true proposition (Mann 2010, p. 286).

In fact, on the contrary, some philosophers are of the view that contingent truths are propositions that are true in some possible world and false in others, while necessary true if there are any, are propositions true in every possible world. This characterization still involves a kind of definitional circularity as pointed rightly pointed out by Quine in reaction to the positivists’ perspective.

From a theological perspective, many theists in order to buttress the nature of the concept of necessity, have taken to emphasizing the difference between God and creatures, “having insisted that although the existence of creatures is a contingent matter, God’s existence is necessary” (Mann 2010, p. 285).

In view of the foregoing, philosophical necessity steadfastly proposes a set of propositions that cannot be falsified. The idea establishes that not all propositions are subject to change or negation, and may never be otherwise. The implication of the above is essential for explanation, coherence and certainty. If propositions were contingent (and not necessary), it follows that no explanation about matter would be consistent. All explanation would be tentatively dependent on chance. By implication, science will lose validity, and will be reduced to an expensive gamble. On this note, it pays us more to accept that some propositions are unshakably absolute. A major task of epistemology has been a quest for certainty, truth is considered an inextricable attribute of knowledge and it is not merely a contingent or probable truths that epistemologists seek but truths which are by their nature necessarily true.

Furthermore, negating the idea of philosophical necessity would make human existence, a directionless voyage into endless obscurity. Humanity would have been like people in a journey to a destination they are ignorant of. Necessity, thus, allows for prediction of the future, because necessary causal laws allow scientists the luxury of tenable hypothesis. For example, if fire is not causally related to heat, heat cannot be expected when there is fire. Necessity, clearly enables us to understand (without being mistaken), the consistent nature of things.

Moreover, could any certainty be found in contingency? perhaps that nothing is certain. Can we build on probabilities? Should knowledge be understood as an open-ended chain of possibilities? Can contingency qualify as knowledge? Whenever we seek knowledge, we do not merely seek contingent truth but something certain. The idea of philosophical necessity helps to sustain the argument that knowledge is reliable, because without necessity, propositions will not be reliable (Aris 2017, p. 12).

Contrarily, philosophical necessity can be questioned in more than one way. Firstly, Joseph Priestley insisted that the idea be disambiguated from concepts like causality, fatalism, determinism etc. But to the point that his methods achieved the said disambiguation, is unsatisfactory at best. Apparently, scholars cannot help but appeal to causation, certainty etc. while explaining necessity. It begs the question: is it possible to isolate the idea of philosophical necessity from its "close relations": fatalism, determinism, causation, certainty etc. Critically, it appears that necessity is a mere synonym for causality, determinism, predictability, certainty etc., and should be vulnerable to the criticisms levelled at them.

Moreover, it is believed (by some scholars), that necessity is a mere tool for science and theology. This claim is given credence by the fact that major proponents of philosophical necessity (Leibniz, Priestley and Hartly etc.) Harbored a theological bias that may have been purely incompatible with contingency.

Beside the above, "if it cannot be falsified, it is utterly senseless." Uduigwomen (2015, p. 235) interpreted Karl Popper's falsificationist theory thus; that necessary truths cannot be otherwise, they
cannot be falsified: if they cannot be falsified; Popper argues that they are unreasonable, and incompatible with experience. Associating Popper's falsificationist theory with the concept of philosophical necessity ridicules the idea of necessity. If necessity entails (as it does), that a proposition is always true, and cannot be otherwise; that proposition becomes nonsensical because it does not meet up to the falsificationist criterion. This is because, escaping falsificationism is viewed by Popper as destroying science (Uduigwomen, 2015) for the end of science is not to find necessary truths, but to be falsified. Popperianism evoke questions like: are there propositions beyond falsification? Is necessary truth a realistic goal? Popper and Popperians will emphatically decline the probes, and by that, entirely disregard the idea of philosophical necessity.

Finally, the Scottish skeptic David Hume, in his attack on causation, discredited philosophical necessity. A very justified claim, if one perceives the dependency of necessity on causal relations. Hume accuses advocates of causal chain, of being unscientific in their inference, because no empirically verifiable necessary connection exist amongst causes and their effects (Uduigwomen, 2015). Hume opines that the pillars of necessity like: incontrovertible natural laws and causal certainty, are assumed. Hume reckons: "There is no object which, implies the existence of another object if we can consider them in themselves" (Uduigwomen 2015, p. 23).

We may find (Hume states), closeness, priority in time and constant conjunction, but not causal connection. Because, for Hume, all events are entirely loose and distinct, importing necessary connections is soothsaying and not science. From Hume's explication: if natural laws of causal implications are not obtainable, the idea of philosophical necessity based on natural causal laws cannot be sustainable. That is, there cannot be any proposition that is granted not to be otherwise because of its part in a causal chain of occurrences, based on natural laws. To summarizes the above argument, Hume declares:

Even after an instance when you have observed a thing to follow upon another: You are not still entitled to form a general rule, or to foretell what would happen in other cases. It being justly esteemed, an unpardonable temerity to judge the entire course of nature by a single experiment, no matter how accurate (Uduigwomen, 2015, p. 238).

CONCLUSION

The idea of philosophical necessity and necessarily true propositions is subject to different understandings. Foundationally, philosophical necessity embraces the notion that some propositions are rigid in their truth value. Such truths are not subject to falsification and are not true by chance. Rather, their truth value is determined by their part in the universal order based on the natural laws of causal implications. Evidently, there are propositions that fit into that category: tautological propositions and mathematical truths are consistent within a system of intrinsic laws and are therefore necessary. Though critics point to the dynamism of nature as obvious credence for contingency, there is no denying that the necessity of certain truth propositions is inherent in them and cannot be altered.

REFERENCES


